This paper demonstrates a trade-o® between the risk-shifting and hedging incentives of¯rms and identi¯es conditions under which each dominates. A¯rm may have the incentive to hedge in a multi-period context, even if no such incentive exists in a singleperiod one. Unrestricted access to swaps in the presence of asymmetric information about¯rm type and the swapping motive would lead to unbounded speculation resulting in breakdown in swap and debt markets. Price-based methods are unable to control this and market makers have to rely upon additional exposure information or credit enhancement devices to preserve equilibrium.
I Introduction
The issue of default risk in swap markets continues to evoke concern, both in academic and practitioner circles. In response to such concerns, recent years have seen the widespread adoption of several`credit enhancement' devices such as netting, marking-to-market, collateralization, and credit triggers, ostensibly to protect the market against losses from counterparty default. Yet, the frequency and extent of such losses have remained at negligible levels throughout the history of the swap market, and the market continues to record explosive growth year after year. The impact of default risk seems to be small on swap pricing practices too | quoted swap prices show little sensitivity to counterparty credit ratings. It is therefore natural to ask if the problem of swap market default risk is indeed as serious as has been commonly portrayed. Moreover, why does the market rely upon nonprice credit enhancement devices to control default risk instead of adjusting swap prices for counterparty credit quality? This paper presents a simple framework for addressing these questions.
The previous literature in the area can be broadly divided into two categories. The¯rst group of papers (Cooper and Mello (1991) , Baz and Pascutti (1996) , Du±e and Huang (1996) , Hentschel and Smith (1997) ) theoretically models the default risk of swaps and provides simulation evidence on its severity. The second group of papers (Sun, Sundaresan and Wang (1993) , Koticha (1993) , Mozumdar (1996) , Minton (1997) , Du±e and Singleton (1997) ) uses actual swap market data to estimate the impact of default risk on interest rate swap pricing. Both strands of the literature conclude that the impact of default risk on swap pricing is small. For example, both Du±e and Singleton (1997) and Minton (1997) nd only weak empirical evidence that default risk is important in swap markets. Similarly, Du±e and Huang (1996) report that a 100 basis points di®erence in debt rates corresponds to a 1 b.p. di®erence in swap rates, while Hentschel and Smith (1997) conservatively estimate the expected annual loss rate to be 0.00025% of the notional principal. In view of such microscopic estimates of the impact of default risk, it may seem that concerns about catastrophic losses are gross exaggerations that can be safely ignored. We argue, however, that jumping to such a conclusion may be incorrect and dangerous. While it is certainly true that in equilibrium, the impact of default risk on swaps is small, it is important to realize that this equilibrium does not arise automatically. Also, while it may represent the most desirable equilibrium, it is not the only one possible. A complete analysis of swap market default risk requires a clear understanding of why¯rms enter into swaps in the¯rst place. The default risk of a swap is drastically higher if it is used for speculation. The problem of swap market default risk is therefore directly related to the more fundamental question of corporate hedging and speculative incentives. Drawing on the hedging and risk-shifting literatures, we show that when there is risky debt outstanding, the hedging motive dominates for pro¯table, well-capitalized¯rms, while the speculative motive does for less pro¯table, poorly-capitalized ones. We also show that the hedging decision depends upon the planning horizon of the¯rm | it may have the incentive to hedge in a multi-period setting, even if it has no such incentive in a single period one. When a swap market opens to satisfy the bona¯de hedging needs of some¯rms, it also has to deal with the possible speculative intent of other¯rms. Excluding all speculative swaps is not possible since the¯rm's true type and its swapping motive are not perfectly observable to the market maker. Thus, the issue of swap market default risk essentially revolves around resolving this information asymmetry, and several apparently enigmatic features of the swap market can be explained as mechanisms for doing so.
We show that when¯rms have such private information, price-based mechanisms are unable to control default risk. Attempting to compensate the swap dealer for the default risk of speculative swaps by raising the cost of swapping to the counterparty would only exacerbate the speculative intent of the pool of counterparties, thereby further increasing default risk and leading to a breakdown in the swap market. Moreover, the debt market would also correctly infer the incentive for some¯rms to speculate with borrowed money and refuse to lend at any interest rate, leading to a breakdown in this market too. Nonprice methods are therefore necessary to control default risk and preserve equilibrium. Such non-price methods may either be the production of additional information by the market maker through long-term relationships and master swap agreements, or the use of credit enhancement devices like netting, marking-to-market, and collateral. When such mechanisms are in place, only hedging-motivated swaps are allowed, default risk ceases to be an important concern, and price-sensitivity to credit rating is unnecessary.
While the analysis in this paper is done in the speci¯c context of swaps, the results can be generalized to other derivative securities like forwards, futures, and collars. Like swaps, these derivatives are zero-present-value securities in which cash in°ows in some future states are paid for by cash out°ows in some other future states. Since the derivative payo® can be positive or negative contingent on the realized state, the dealer is exposed to the risk of 1 default by the counterparty, as in a swap. Analysis similar to that presented here indicates that non-price mechanisms are required to control default risk in markets for such other derivatives as well. For exchange-traded futures, this function is served primarily by the daily marking-to-market process. For over-the-counter derivatives like forwards and collars, dealers rely upon credit-enhancement devices similar to those used for swaps.
The paper makes contributions in the following directions. It connects the risk-shifting and hedging literatures to demonstrate the existence of a trade-o® between these two counteracting incentives and identi¯es conditions under which each dominates. It shows that the hedging incentive becomes stronger as the number of time periods under consideration increases. It highlights features of swap contracts that make them well suited for hedging the risk of¯nancial distress associated with risky debt. In a setting of asymmetric information about true¯rm type, trying to control default risk of swaps through pricing would 1 In fact, a single-period swap is identical to a forward. Similarly, a multi-period swap can be seen as a portfolio of forwards, some of which are in-the-money and the others out-of-the-money, so that the portfolio as a whole has zero value. lead to unbounded speculation by all¯rms resulting in breakdown in both the swap and debt markets. Consequently some form of non-price credit control mechanism is shown to be necessary to attain equilibrium. Finally it shows how several institutional features of the swap market are useful as such mechanisms and thus provides a complete theoretical characterization of the swap contract.
II Debt, Swaps, and Default Risk A Swaps: Some Stylized Facts A swap is a¯nancial contract between two counterparties under which each pays the other a stream of cash°ows based on a certain notional principal, where the cash-°ows are indexed to two publicly observable macroeconomic variables like interest rates, foreign exchange 2 rates, or commodity prices. In many swaps, payments by one counterparty are¯xed, so 3 the net swap payments are contingent on only one index variable. A swap contract thus embodies a positive exposure to one underlying economic risk factor and a negative exposure to another. If it is of a¯xed-for-°oating form, then it is a claim contingent upon only the single risk factor to which the°oating leg is indexed. It is therefore a useful instrument for a¯rm that wishes to alter its risk exposure to one speci¯c factor, or to substitute it by another factor.
In a perfect market, it is possible to create such pure individual factor claims even in the absence of derivative securities like swaps. If there are N linearly independent sources of risk in the economy, then in principle it is possible to create pure factor claims by forming portfolios of N linearly independent primary securities. But such portfolios will in general have short positions in some securities. In a world with short-sales constraints therefore, the introduction of swaps increases the e®ective span of securities. The high degree of liquidity in markets for several types of swaps, the availability of dealers willing to create specialized swaps to suit individual client needs, and small transaction costs further enhance the attractiveness of swaps as risk management instruments.
Short sales constraints are imposed by market-makers and regulators to minimize the impact of default risk in the economy. Does a swap, which embodies a short position in one of the two legs, violate this constraint and therefore expose the¯nancial system to a large degree of default risk? Our model shows that the answer to the problem lies in certain apparently anomalous features of the swap market. First, among the pool of acceptable counterparties there is little or no di®erence in pricing between higher and lower rated rms: swap dealers quote the same rate to all counterparties. Second, until recently, there used to be a strictly binary accept/reject rule regarding the acceptability of¯rms as swap counterparties. Only¯rms with investment-grade credit rating were allowed to participate; sub-investment-grade¯rms were not. The situation has changed in recent years, but even now, there are stringent credit-enhancement clauses (netting, collateral, credit triggers, marking-to-market etc.) imposed on sub-investment grade counterparties. Our analysis indicates that both these features are directly related to insulating the swap contract from default risk.
B Factor Risks and Financial Distress
The major utility of swaps lies in ameliorating costs of¯nancial distress associated with debt by making risky debt less risky. Debt has some characteristics that make it attractive as a¯nancing choice, viz., tax deductibility of interest and removal of free cash-°ow from empire-building' managers. However, it carries with it the risk of¯nancial (as distinct from economic) distress which occurs when the cash in°ows of the¯rm are insu±cient to meet 4 its debt obligations at speci¯c points in time, even if the going-concern value is positive.
Financial distress arises due to mismatch between the¯rm's cash in°ows and out°ows. Debt represents¯xed or exogenously indexed claims on the¯rm. The¯rm's ability to service the debt, however, depends on its operating performance which in turn depends on its exposure to risk factors in the economy such as interest-rate risk, currency risk, price of oil risk, etc. Let there be N risk factors X ; X ; ::::X and let the sensitivity of the¯rm's
where e is idiosyncratic risk, with E(e) = E(ejX ) = 0; 8i: Let the cost of debt be R, with i P E(Y ) = ®+¯E(X ) > R so that the¯rm is able to service its debt on average. However,
if the variance of project returns, V ar(Y ) =¯V ar(X ) + V ar(e) is large, then default i i will occur in some states. If¯xed-for-°oating swaps exist for each one of the N factors, then the¯rm can use them to reduce this default possibility. A¯xed-for-°oating swap indexed to X has payo® S = X ¡ X , where X is the swap rate, and to hedge completely,
the¯rm takes a position w = ¡¯in S . Assuming risk-neutrality (see the next section),
Then the combined cash-°ow Y on the project and the swap is
As before, E(Y ) = ® +¯E(X ) > R, so that the mean pro¯tability of the¯rm remains
Thus, an appropriate set of swaps reduces S the possibility of default by e®ectively indexing the net debt obligations to the same risk factors to which the operating cash-°ows are exposed. Most swaps are associated with some outstanding issue of debt. A swap's maturity, coupon dates, and notional principal are often the same as those of the associated debt. Some swaps originate in conjunction with the issuance of new debt, while others are used to alter the risk characteristics of preexisting debt. In keeping with the existence of nonstandard debt structures, there exist non-standard swaps too, e.g., amortizing swaps, accreting swaps, etc. A swap is particularly useful in a dynamic context: even if the debt is indexed to the appropriate risk factors at origination, changes in the¯rm's business operations over time alter the risk pro¯le of its cash-°ows, thus increasing the risk of¯nancial distress. Replacing old debt with new debt on a regular basis would entail large transaction costs while an appropriate swap attains the same objective inexpensively.
The possibility of default on debt may also be reduced by using related derivative securities like futures or forwards. However, to hedge the risk associated with coupon debt, the¯rm has to enter into several forward/futures contracts, one for each individual coupon payment and one for the terminal cash-°ow. A swap on the other hand hedges the risk of all payment obligations in one transaction. In a world with transaction costs, swaps are therefore more attractive hedging vehicles. In this sense, a swap is a security that is designed to provide the least-cost hedging solution to the default risk of risky debt.
C Variance Reduction versus Risk-Shifting
Reducing cash-°ow variance appears to be a plausible explanation for the use of swaps, but it runs against the traditional concept of risk-shifting. In particular, the con°ict of interest between debt and equity arising from equity payo® being bounded from below at zero induces equityholders to increase the riskiness of the¯rm's cash-°ows and not reduce it (Merton (1974) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) ).
More recently, however, a distinct strand of literature seeking to explain corporate hedging has emerged. The risk-shifting result holds only in the absence of all dissipative costs of nancial distress and externalities related to loss of control. The hedging literature explores situations where this assumption is not valid. The underlying reason to hedge has been variously identi¯ed as managerial risk aversion, a progressive tax schedule, bankruptcy costs, and excessive costs of external¯nancing when internal cash°ows are insu±cient to meet positive NPV investment requirements (Stulz (1984 (Stulz ( ,1990 , Smith and Stulz (1985) , Smith, Smithson and Wilford (1990) , Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) , DeMarzo and Du±e (1995) , Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) ). The common feature here is that the payo® to the insider/decisionmaker is a concave function of the¯rm's cash°ows, which counteracts the convex call option-like feature of equity. Bessembinder (1991) shows that even in the absence of direct¯nancial distress costs or progressive taxes, hedging may increase¯rm value by reducing underinvestment caused by agency problems between equityholders and senior claimants like creditors. Hedging redistributes new investment payo®s across states in such a way that equityholders receive positive payo®s in more states, increasing their incentives to make those (positive-NPV) investments. In a di®erent setting, John and John (1993) show that when the agency cost of debt is high, it is in shareholders' interest to precommit to reducing¯rm cash-°ow variance by means of a suitably designed concave management compensation contract. Diamond (1991) makes a similar point by modeling the private bene¯ts derived by the insider by simply being in control and`excessive' liquidations by debtholders who do not take these control rents into account. Minton (1993) extends Diamond's framework to the interest-rate risk hedging context. Franke, Stapleton, and Subrahmanyam (1998) distinguish between hedgeable and unhedgeable risks, and show that¯rms having di®erent degrees of relative exposures to them will have incentives to buy and sell hedging products like options.
These papers clearly demonstrate the existence of conditions which mitigate the ex-post risk-shifting incentive of equity in the presence of risky debt. Our analysis builds on it and the traditional risk-shifting idea to show that a trade-o® exists between these con°icting incentives. Proposition 1 in Section IV-A shows that a corporate motive to hedge systematic risks may or may not arise endogenously for a¯rm, depending upon the relative sizes of the predictable and unpredictable components of the¯rm's returns. Further, Proposition 2 shows that the possibility of positive equity payo®s in future periods may induce a¯rm to hedge in a multi-period context, even if is not optimal to do so in a single-period one.
III The Model
Our basic model is a simple single-period (2-date) one. At time-0, the¯rm has an opportunity to invest $1 in a project. To¯nance the investment, the¯rm issues debt claims against the (uncertain) time-1 cash-°ows from the project. The riskfree single-period interest-rate is R . The promised Interest-rate on a¯rm's debt is R(R > R ) if the debt is seen as being f f risky by lenders. All¯nancing is provided by a large, risk-neutral market.
To concentrate on the impact of hedgeable, systematic risks in the economy, we assume an exact linear factor structure of returns generated by the project. Using an inexact factor structure, i.e., including an error term in the returns generating process, would introduce an additional unhedgeable risk in the model and make perfect hedging impossible, but would not a®ect the basic analysis of hedging and speculation with systematic risks. For simplicity, assume there is only a single source of risk X in the economy. The risk factor return from its project. The risk factor X refers to an economic variable that is not speci¯cally related to the business of the¯rm but a®ects returns in a general, macro sense. A typical example would be the short-term interest-rate risk for a manufacturing¯rm. The¯rm has no particular advantage in working with this factor. However, returns from every project (except lending at the risk-free rate) are necessarily correlated with it. Let s be the state of the world realized at time-1. Then X(s) represents the risk-factor realization.
Assumption 2: X(s) is distributed uniformly over the interval [¡K; K], K¸0:
Note that m is a function of the¯rm type while X is a function of the realized state at time-1, i.e., for each¯rm type, m has a¯xed value and no variability, while X has 2 0 expectation and variance = K =3: Also note the irrelevance of the sign of¯for the risk-return pro¯le of the¯rm. A¯rm with exposure¯and one with exposure ¡¯both 2 2
have an expected return m and volatility¯K =3. While the sign of¯determines the ex-post realization of cash-°ows, only its magnitude is relevant for determining the ex-ante distribution of those cash-°ows. This point plays an important role in our analysis later.
We assume the following information structure. The¯rm observes its expected project return m with perfect precision. This is private information and is not observable to the market. What is public knowledge, instead, is the¯rm's credit rating » which is m plus a random, zero-mean noise ². The credit rating represents the external market's expectation of the¯rm's ability to service its debt, i.e., its expected future cash-°ow position. We make the following distributional assumption about ². Assumption 3: ² is distributed uniformly in the range [¡e; e].
The complete sequence of events can now be summarized. At time-0, the¯rm observes the expected return on the project m while the market observes a noisy credit rating » based on which it sets a debt rate R(»). Based on m and R(»), the¯rm decides (a) whether to borrow and invest and (b) whether to hedge. Conditional on the¯rm's borrowing and investing, the project matures at time-1, cash-°ows are generated and claims are paid o®. Appendix A provides a summary of symbols used in the model.
IV Incentives for Hedging....
A Exogenous Cost of Debt
As discussed in Section II-C, theoretical explanations of corporate hedging have sought to identify¯nancial market imperfections and tax-related reasons that create incentives for hedging. Proposition 1 describes the trade-o® between the hedging and risk-shifting incentives of the¯rm in the presence of such imperfections, and shows that its resolution depends upon the relative magnitudes of the predictable and risky components of the¯rm's cash-°ows. In this section, we consider hedging-motivated swaps only, i.e., swap positions that reduce cash-°ow sensitivity to the risk factor X. An unhedged position thus refers to a zero swap position. Speculative swaps are introduced in Section V. For simplicity, the (gross) cost of debt R is assumed to be exogenously given in this subsection and the next. We relax this assumption and endogenize R in subsection C.
Proposition 1a considers the case when the insider receives control rents which are lost Proposition 1b considers the other reasons that have been suggested for corporate hedging, i.e., the various causes of concavity of the insider's payo® as a function of the¯rm's cash-°ows (managerial risk aversion, progressive taxes, underinvestment when external¯-nance is more costly, etc.). Thus we assume that the insider's payo® f (¢) is a positive, increasing, and concave function of the¯rm's net cash-°ow m +¯X ¡ R. where the threshold quality level m = R +°and°2 (0;¯K).
2
Unlike°in Proposition 1a, an explicit expression for°is not possible because no speci¯c
functional form for f (¢) has been assumed. Proposition 1 (a,b) considers various sources of pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs to 7 the insider that provide an incentive to hedge. In combination with the powerful riskshifting incentive of equity in the presence of risky debt, this leads to a similar result in both cases: given a cost of debt R, it is optimal for¯rms with quality m greater than a ¤ cut-o® level m = R +°to hedge, while not hedging is optimal for¯rms with m below this level. Proposition 1a is illustrated in Table 1 Note that while the proposition implicitly assumes a positive exposure¯to the risk factor X, an identical result holds when the exposure is negative. As described in Section III, the direction of the exposure is unimportant for the ex-ante mean-variance characteristics of the¯rm. Since the distribution of X is symmetric about zero, a¯rm with unhedged cash-°ows m ¡¯X (¯> 0) also has the incentive to hedge if m > R +°and not to hedge otherwise, where°is as de¯ned in the proposition.
The economic intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. The payo® function to thē rm insider has both a convex and a concave section. The convexity arises due to the payo® being bounded from below at zero, while the concavity is due to bankruptcy costs/control rents in (a), and managerial risk aversion, progressive taxation, underinvestment when external funds are costlier, etc. in (b). In each case, the concavity induces a hedging motive which is stronger when expected¯rm cash-°ows are larger, i.e., for¯rms with superior quality m. The incentive e®ect of the convexity, on the other hand, can be seen in terms of the well-known equivalence between equity and a call option on the assets of thē rm which induces the insider to increase risk. When the call is deep in-the-money, i.e., the expected¯rm cash-°ow is far greater than the required debt payment (m > R +°), the option vega (option value sensitivity to volatility) is low and the variance-increasing 7 This result can be generalized to include distributions other than the uniform distribution for X. For ¤ m to exist it is su±cient that lim f (m +¯X ¡ R)g(X)dX = 0, where g(¢) is the density function for
X. This condition imposes a mild restiction on f (¢), one that is trivially satis¯ed for any concave f (¢) and non-fat-tailed g(¢).
incentive of the insider is small. Therefore, the hedging incentive induced by the concave section of the payo® function dominates. On the other hand, when the call is close to being at-the-money, (m < R +°), vega is high and the risk-shifting incentive dominates.
B Extension to Multi-Period Settings
The above results are based on a single-period analysis. The next proposition shows that when the analysis is extended to a multi-period framework, the threshold level of expected ¤ project return for which hedging becomes optimal (m ) is reduced. To illustrate the impact of extending the decision horizon of the¯rm, assume that none of the conditions of 00 Proposition 1 hold, i.e., B = 0 and f (¢) = 0. Under such conditions it would never be optimal for the equityholders to hedge in a single-period context. Yet, in a repeated game, hedging is shown to be optimal for equityholders for a very large range of values of m. Proposition 2: Let the¯rm face the single-period problem described above repeatedly for T successive periods. Then it is optimal for it to hedge in the¯rst period i® its quality
where the threshold quality level
When T = 1, the condition for hedging to be optimal is m > R +¯K. But for m > R +¯K, the equityholder's payo® is linear in X and the¯rm is indi®erent between hedging and not hedging. Therefore, it is not optimal for any¯rm to hedge. When T > 1 ¤ ¤ however, m (T ) < R+¯K, and for¯rms with m 2 (m (T ); R+¯K), it is optimal to hedge.
¤
The quality threshold level m (T ) is a decreasing function of T which implies that the set of¯rms for which hedging is optimal expands as T increases. In the limit,¯rms with even 8 marginally positive NPV projects¯nd it optimal to hedge. The intuition here is simple: in a one-shot game, the equityholders clearly have an incentive to increase cash-°ow variance. Even though this increases default risk, the equityholder is not averse to it since the¯rm is liquidated at the end of the period anyway. In a repeated game, however, the equityholder has an incentive to keep the¯rm going in later periods also. If the game is repeated a su±cient number of times, it is in the interest of the equityholder to cooperate with the bondholder and not to increase default risk by increasing cash-°ow variance.
C Endogenizing the Cost of Debt
The analysis has so far considered the debt market rate R to be exogenously speci¯ed. Given the distributions of the¯rm types m and observation error ², and the decision rule of rms with respect to hedging (propositions 1 and 2), R can be endogenized in equilibrium.
To be speci¯c, we assume that the structure of Proposition 1a holds, i.e., a¯rm hedges if its ¤ quality m exceeds m = R +°, where°= max[¯K ¡ 2B; 0] and B represents bene¯ts lost in default. Also, in order to highlight the e®ect of observation error, we restrict attention
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to one speci¯c value of risk exposure¯. In particular, let¯= 1 and assume¯> . The K rst assumption is without any loss of generality as none of the results are qualitatively dependent upon¯. The second assumption helps to focus on the more interesting case of the possible pool of¯rms including all three types | those that are inherently infeasible (m < R ), those that have positive NPV but do not have the incentive to hedge, and those f 9
that have the incentive to hedge. We also de¯ne a new variable ± = » ¡ R(») to obtain closed-form representations of R(»). In intuitive terms, ± represents the external market's perception of the expected future cash-°ow accruing to the equityholder. A high value of ± indicates that the¯rm's equity o®ers a substantial bond of compliance on its debt, making the debt safer. Proposition 3: Let the market observe a noisy version » of¯rm quality m, » = m + ²,
with ² distributed uniformly over the interval [¡e; e], and e < K. Assume¯= 1¸. If a K swap market for hedging is available, then the equilibrium cost of debt R(») is given by the following implicit closed-form representations
If a swap market for hedging is not available, then the equilibrium cost of debt R(») is given by
Proposition 3 shows that the introduction of a swap market for hedging unambiguously improves welfare. Some¯rms for which the variable ± lies in the range (°¡ e; K + e) have the incentive to hedge with swaps in their own ex post interest. The debt market correctly infers their incentive to hedge, perceives debt issued by these¯rms to be riskfree, and reduces their required debt rate R. Thus for this set of¯rms, default risk and cost of debt are reduced by the availability of swaps. Table 2 illustrates the result for a set of parameter values. Note that the extreme values of R(»; e) are the same for all levels of measrement error: R + K when » = R ¡ e ¡ K and f R when »¸R +°+e. Also, » is seen to have a self-ful¯lling prophecy-like property:¯rms f f which receive an incorrectly low rating face a higher cost of debt R(») which (a) increases
The pool of¯rms in case of¯< consists of only the¯rst and third types and the analysis there is a K 2B subset of that with¯> .
K the possibility of their cash-°ows being less than the required debt payment and (b) in some cases makes it optimal for them not to hedge while it would have been optimal to hedge if their cost of debt had been at the perfect information level R(m)(< R(»)).
V ....and Incentives for Speculating A Speculation and Default Risk with Asymmetric Information
The previous section presents a very comforting picture of swap use. High-quality¯rms (m¸R +°) use swaps for hedging, thereby reducing their default risk and cost of debt. Low-quality¯rms (m < R +°) stay away from the swap market. Overall, swaps improve welfare by reducing expected bankruptcy costs etc. for those¯rms for which the hedging motive dominates the risk-shifting incentive. In particular, given our model's assumption of an exact factor structure of returns, there is no risk of swap default and the swap rate X equals E(X) = 0. In a more realistic case of including an error term in the returns process, there exists some residual default risk, but it is likely to be negligibly small (Du±e and Huang (1996) , Hentschel and Smith (1997) ). This analysis is valid only if speculative swaps are assumed not to exist. In reality, however, bad¯rms (i.e.,¯rms with quality m < R +°) will not only not have an incentive to hedge, but by the same risk-shifting argument, have an incentive to increase cash-°ow variance by participating in speculative swaps. This is the crux of the problem of default risk in swap markets: speculative swaps expose the swap dealer to the risk of counterparty default in those states where the risk factor X has low realizations.
The problem of speculation arises from the information asymmetry between the¯rm and the swap dealer about the¯rm's operating exposure¯to the underlying risk factor X. If the dealer knows the direction of the exposure, it can use this knowledge and the sign of the proposed swap position w to infer if the swap is intended for hedging or for speculation. For example, it is plausible that a dealer knows that a short-funded S&L is 10 exposed to the risk of interest rates increasing. Therefore, such an S&L's attempt to buy a¯xed-for-°oating interest rate swap (i.e., pay¯xed and receive°oating) would likely be interpreted as a hedge by the dealer, while trying to sell such a swap (i.e., pay°oating and receive¯xed) would be seen as speculation, and therefore disallowed.
Unfortunately however, dealers do not have this information in all cases, i.e., for all counterparties, for all risk factors, and at all times. For example, while a dealer may reliably infer the interest rate sensitivity of a short-funded S&L as mentioned above, the exposures of manufacturing and retailing¯rms to interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices are likely to be more ambiguous and subject to°uctuations over time. In such situations then, dealers have to rely upon the observed counterparty credit rating » to infer the swapping motive. As shown in the previous section, it is impossible to precisely distinguish between hedgers and non-hedgers on this basis due to the noisiness of observed credit quality ». The problem is more severe now because non-hedgers use swaps to speculate, 10 We are indebted to Cli®ord W. Smith for this example.
which increases the probability and severity of default. Lemma 1: High-quality¯rms (m¸R +°+ wX) use swaps to hedge. Low-quality¯rms (m < R +°+ wX) use swaps to speculate.
The swap market observes the swap position w of the counterparty, but does not know if it is motivated by hedging or speculative incentives. It therefore pools all such counterparties and charges a common swap price X. Within the pool of counterparties, for a given swap position w and swap rate X, the higher-quality¯rms (m¸R +°+ wX) have the incentive to hedge, and the lower-quality¯rms (m < R +°+ wX) to speculate.
Consider, as in the previous section, the case where the size of the exposure¯is 1, but its direction is unknown, i.e., cash°ow Y = m § X, and speculative swaps are possible. When a¯rm proposes a swap position w = 1, the dealer cannot infer if (1) the¯rm's true quality m > R +°+ X, its exposure¯= ¡1, and the swap is intended to be a hedge, or (2) the¯rm's true quality m < R +°+ X, its exposure¯= +1, and the swap is intended to speculatively`double up' the pre-existing exposure. Proposition 4 describes swap and debt market equilibria in this case. Following previous literature in the area (Cooper and Mello (1991) , Baz and Pascutti (1996) ), here we assume swaps to be junior to debt in case of default. However, we show in the next subsection that the main results on the incentives to hedge or speculate are insensitive to the speci¯c seniority structure assumed. Proposition 4: Let the market observe a noisy version » of¯rm quality m, » = m + ², with ² distributed uniformly over the interval [¡e; e], and e < K. Firms with quality m > R +°+ X have exposure¯= ¡1 and take swap position w = 1 to hedge, whilē rms with quality m < R +°+ X have exposure¯= +1 and take swap position w = 1 to speculate. The equilibrium debt rate R(»; e) and swap rate X(»; e) are described by equations (A1a|A4b) in Appendix A. Unfortunately, we are unable to obtain closed-form expressions for R(»; e) and X(»; e) from equations (A1a,A1b) and (A3a,A3b). However, it is easy to solve for them numerically for speci¯c parameter values. Table 3 , Panels A and B present debt rates R(»; e) and swap rates X(»; e), respectively, for a set of parameters. The impact of speculative swaps can be clearly seen by comparing the net cost of debt, R(»; e) + X(»; e), with the debt rate R(»; e) reported in Table 2A , where speculative swaps are assumed not to exist.
There are two points here worth noting. First, when speculative swaps are allowed, the probability of default by a non-hedger (speculator) as well as the extent of debt and swap losses in case of default are higher. Consequently, the required net debt rate, R(»; e) + X(»; e) is higher. The second point concerns the incentives of¯rms to hedge or speculate. Since the overall cost of debt is higher when speculative swaps are allowed, the quality ¤ threshold, m = R(»; e) + X(»; e) +°, above which it is optimal to hedge is also higher. Therefore, the set of¯rms for which hedging is optimal becomes smaller when speculative swaps are allowed. As a second-order e®ect, this further raises the net cost of debt.
These results are illustrated in Figure 1 . The curve hh represents the quality threshold Table 2A ). The curve ss shows m = R(») + X(») +°when speculative swaps are allowed (Proposition 4/Table 3A, B). Region B in the¯gure consists of¯rms that have the incentive to hedge if speculative swaps are somehow excluded; but if such speculation cannot be prevented, then the very presence of such swaps distorts the incentive structure of these¯rms and makes it optimal for them to speculate. Note that a similar result holds for swap position w = ¡1. Firms with quality m > R +°+ X and exposure¯= +1 take swap positions w = ¡1 to hedge. They are pooled with by¯rms with quality m < R +°+ X and exposure¯= ¡1 that take identical swap positions (w = ¡1) to speculate. Swap and debt rates are identical to those described in Proposition 4. Figure 2 summarizes the various combinations of m;¯; and w possible.
B Relative Seniority of Debt and Swap Contracts
The analysis of the previous subsection assumes that in case of default, swaps are junior to debt. While earlier papers too have typically made this assumption, the actual legal position is less clear. Claims on a defaulted party are governed by the Bankruptcy Code for non-¯nancial¯rms, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) for¯nancial institutions, which place several restrictions on such claims if a bankruptcy petition has been led. In view of the adverse impact this has on swaps and similar contracts, the Financial Institutions Reforms, Recovery and Enforcement Act (1989) and the 1990 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code have relaxed many of these restrictions for swaps and similar quali¯ed nancial contracts, making the juniority of swaps questionable. Further, the geographical location of incorporation of the defaulted¯rm, and the legal jurisdiction under which it falls are often unclear. Therefore, it is important to examine how our results may be a®ected if the assumption of swap juniority is not valid.
It turns out, however, that the main results on the incentive structure of hedging and speculation are completely insensitive to changes in the seniority of swaps vis-a-vis debt. Both swaps and debt represent external claims on the¯rm's cash-°ows. While their relative seniority impacts the state-contingent payo®s to the individual claims, the total payo® is always max(m+X; R+X¡X), with the total expected payout equaling expected debt payo® plus expected swap payo® = R + 0 = R . Therefore, while the debt rate R and the swap f f rate X assume di®erent values for di®erent seniority structures, their sum, R + X, remains ¤ constant. Consequently, the quality cut-o® level for hedging to be optimal, m = R+X +°, is insensitive to changes in swap seniority relative to debt. For example, when the swap is senior to the debt, R and X are as described by equations (A5a|A10b) in Appendix A. Table 3 , Panel C reports R for the earlier set of parameters. Note that the juniority of the debt raises the debt rate and lowers the swap rate (X = 0) compared to the junior swap case. However, the sum of swap and debt rates when the swap is junior (Panels A and B) equals the debt rate when the swap is senior (Panel C), the swap rate being 0 in that case.
C Unbounded Speculation and Market Failure
Speculative swaps become even more problematic when we relax our simplifying restriction of j¯j = 1. If¯rms have arbitrary levels of exposure¯, then¯rms with quality m > R +°+ wX will hedge by taking swap positions w = ¡¯. This provides the cover necessary for bad¯rms (m < R+°+wX) with exposures in the opposite direction to take speculative swap positions w = ¡¯. Lemma 2 shows that in the absence of size restrictions on swap positions, speculators will seek to take unboundedly large positions in swaps. Lemma 2: Let all swap positions be allowed. Then it is optimal for a bad¯rm to take an unboundedly large position w in the swap.
If¯rms could credibly commit to not exceeding given swap positions w, equilibrium would obtain at those levels. However, given the speculative intent of bad¯rms as characterized in Lemma 2, such commitments are not credible. In all cases, debt and swap 11 ¤ rates increase with the swap position w. For any given cost of debt R (»), a speculatinḡ rm has incentive to take a large enough speculative position w in the swap such that ¤ R(»; w) > R (»). Therefore in the absence of ex-ante limits on swap position w, no value of R will provide the necessary expected return of R to lenders.
f Further, the incentive of bad¯rms to take on large swap position w leads to a high ¤ value of X as well as R. This raises the threshold level of m (m = R +°+ wX), and reduces the proportion of¯rms for which hedging is optimal. In other words, if large swap positions are allowed, and if the swap dealer cannot identify and exclude speculators, then the resultant increase in R and X will distort the incentives for even some of those¯rms for which it was originally optimal to hedge, and induce them to speculate as well. For large enough w, there will be no counterparties with genuine hedging motives (m¸R +°+ wX), leading to breakdowns in both swap and debt markets. Thus, in the absence of limits on w, the original welfare-improving objective of the swap market, viz., to provide hedging instruments to good¯rms, is not attained. Attempting to compensate the swap dealer for the additional default risk of a doubtful counterparty thus has the reverse e®ect of further increasing the default risk of the swap. Price-based mechanisms by themselves are therefore unable to control swap market default risk arising from speculative swaps. Figure 3 illustrates this point. An observed credit rating » implies that true¯rm quality ¤ in the pool ranges from » ¡ e to » + e. If w is small,¯rms in the pool with m¸m (w) ¤ (region A in the¯gure) have the incentive to hedge. As w increases, so does m , so that ¤ beyond a certain value of w, all¯rms in the pool have m < m , i.e., the speculative incentive dominates.
D Mechanisms to Control Swap Market Speculation
Attempts to control speculation and the resultant default risk therefore have to rely upon non-price mechanisms. The explosive growth of the swap market and the remarkably few instances of default indicate that such mechanisms do exist and are e®ective in excluding speculative swaps. The empirical literature also supports the view that¯rms use swaps almost always to hedge and seldom, if ever, to speculate. (See, e.g., Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) , Mian (1996) and Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) .) However, our analysis shows that this happy outcome does not arise automatically | as Hentschel and Smith (1997) note, \derivatives dealers have incentives to monitor customers' use of derivatives to ensure that they use derivatives to hedge." How do dealers ensure this? First, as mentioned before, dealers often have access to information about counterparty characteristics which mitigates the information asymmetry concerning the motive behind the swap. Speci¯cally, the dealer may know the direction of the counterparty's operating exposure to the underlying risk factor, based on which, it can infer whether the swap is meant to be a hedge or not. Unfortunately however, dealers do not always have such information and have to rely upon the observed counterparty credit rating » to infer the swapping motive.
When the measurement error ² is limited, it is possible to implement the simple accept/reject decision rule based on » that guarantees the exclusion of speculative swaps. This was indeed the case in swap markets until recently. Swap dealers did not discriminate between counterparties of di®erent credit ratings so long as they were above a certain threshold level (usually investment-grade). Counterparties of lower credit ratings were simply excluded from the market. Our model o®ers an explanation for such a scheme. A high ¤ enough credit rating (» > » = R +°+ e) means that all¯rms in the pool have true f quality m > R +°. This implies low default risk not only because the¯rms' projects are f inherently safer, but also because such¯rms have the endogenous incentive to hedge and thus reduce their default probabilities even further. There is thus no reason for swap dealers to charge higher rates from less-than-perfect counterparties so long as they are rated above this cut-o® level. Unfortunately, such a decision rule denies the opportunity to swap to a ¤ set of good¯rms (m > m ) with genuine hedging motives, but whose credit rating » lies ¤ below the cuto® level » . This represents the unavoidable e±ciency loss of a second best solution due to asymmetric information about¯rm quality.
More recently however, sub-investment-grade counterparties have been allowed to enter into swap contracts, largely due to two developments. First, much of the business has moved away from investment banks to commercial banks which have long term relationships with swap counterparties. Such a relationship provides the bank with better information about (a) the nature of the underlying operating exposure and (b) the true¯rm quality than is provided by only the credit rating of the¯rm. This alleviates the asymmetric information problem and enables some of the sub-investment-grade¯rms to be correctly identi¯ed as having the hedging incentive. Second, the market has increasingly come to rely on non-price credit enhancement mechanisms to limit swap exposures, especially with counterparties of doubtful quality. The most commonly used credit enhancement devices are:
Credit triggers: The dealer has the right to terminate all swaps with a counterparty if the counterparty's credit rating falls below a prespeci¯ed level or if it defaults on some other obligation to another party. It thus o®ers the swap dealer an early exit from a deteriorating credit situation.
Collateral: The counterparty has to put up collateral to cover possible dealer losses in case of default. Unlike margin requirements for futures contracts, most swaps and related OTC contracts do not require collateral when the credit exposure is small, but only when it exceeds some prespeci¯ed level. The nature and extent of collateral varies from case to case, and are naturally more restrictive for weaker counterparties.
Marking-to-market: The swap's market value is calculated on a regular basis and the change in value since the last evaluation is transferred between the dealer and the counterparty. The swap is`recouponed', i.e., the swap rate is reset so that the new exposure becomes equal or close to zero. Gains and losses are thus settled up regularly, and large credit exposures are not allowed to build up. A variation on this practice combines recouponing with collateralization: at intermediate points between scheduled recouponings, the swap value is measured and additional collateral has to be put up if necessary.
Netting: Since a dealer and a¯rm usually have several swap contracts between them at any one time, it is customary to consolidate the treatment of all mutual swaps through a master agreement. Given the unsettled legal position, netting protects the dealer against the¯rm strategically`cherry-picking' those swaps that are in-the-money for it, and seeking bankruptcy protection on those that are out-of-the-money for it. Wakeman (1996) provides a detailed survey of credit enhancement techniques. The common objective of all these mechanisms is attenuating the credit exposure of the swap position w, thereby reducing the market-maker's value-at-risk as well as mitigating the counterparty's incentive to speculate by limiting the gains from speculation.
As swap markets have become more liquid and competitive, it has become increasingly important for dealers to provide quick quotes without exhaustive analyses of individual counterparties. Dealers have therefore come to rely upon credit enhancement clauses to take care of default risk concerns, resulting in such clauses becoming standard features of swap contracts today. This assures participants in both debt and swap markets that all realized swap transactions are undertaken for hedging purposes and default risk ceases to be important. Given our assumption of the swap variable being the same as the underlying risk factor X, our model implies a default probability of zero and consequently, complete insensitivity of swap prices to counterparty credit rating. In reality the swap variable and the risk factor may be less than perfectly correlated resulting in some residual default risk, but its magnitude would be negligibly small. Hentschel and Smith (1997) , for example, report a conservative estimate of 0.05% default probability per annum. Similarly, Du±e and Huang (1996) provide simulation evidence suggesting that a di®erence of 100 b.p. in debt markets translates into a 1 b.p. di®erence in interest rate swap rates.
The result on the insensitivity of swap prices to credit ratings and reliance on nonprice mechanisms to control default risk is similar in spirit to the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explanation of credit rationing in debt markets. The analysis becomes somewhat more complex because now equilibrium has to be jointly determined in swap and debt markets. Interestingly, non-price devices to control default risk are required not in the debt market, but in the swap market. The existence of these mechanisms limits the ability of bad¯rms to risk-shift and is able to sustain equilibrium in both markets.
VI Conclusion
In recent years there has been much concern about default risk in swap markets. This paper presents a simple theoretical framework for analyzing the incentive structure underlying the issue. It argues that the basic utility of a swap lies in its ability to ameliorate the direct and indirect costs of risky debt. A swap is a zero-present-value repackaging of cash-°ows across states of nature that results in indexing the net external claims on the¯rm (the combined cash-°ows on the debt and the swap) to the appropriate sources of risk in the economy. Better alignment of the risk pro¯les of the cash in°ows and out°ows results in a lower probability of¯nancial distress and thus reduces the¯rm's cost of issuing debt.
This bene¯t has to be weighed against the insider's incentive to risk-shift. Our model predicts that the resolution of the trade-o® depends upon the relative magnitudes of the predictable and risky components of cash in°ows: good¯rms hedge, bad¯rms do not. Moreover, the incentive to hedge becomes stronger as the number of time periods under consideration increases. The debt market recognizes this and sets the lending rate accordingly. Thus, other things remaining the same, the introduction of hedging instruments like swaps reduces the incidence of default and cost of debt in the economy.
Unfortunately however, the availability of these very instruments o®ers low-quality¯rms a vehicle to speculate with. If not controlled, this would combine with their strong risk shifting incentives to cause breakdowns in both the debt and derivative markets. For a nontrivial equilibrium to exist therefore, the derivative market has to control default risk somehow. We show that this function is performed by swap market makers by (a) interpreting the information in operating risk exposures of end-users, (b) sorting on credit rating and excluding counterparties which fall below a certain level, (c) maintaining longterm relationships with counterparties to reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and (d) relying on other credit enhancement devices like credit triggers, netting, and markingto-market to severely limit the exposure of swap positions, as indeed observed in the swap market. In the presence of such mechanisms, our model predicts insensitivity of swap rates to credit rating among the pool of acceptable counterparties, thus providing a theoretical justi¯cation of this observation in earlier papers.
There are several other empirically testable implications of the model. First, the results that (a) high quality¯rms have the incentive to hedge, and (b) that the market is able to exclude speculative swaps, together imply that among the pool of¯rms with similar (imprecisely observed) ex-ante quality, those that are allowed to swap should subsequently be revealed to be of superior quality | either through rating upgrades or through better operating performance. However, a test of this hypothesis has to be implemented carefully: the model also predicts that a properly designed swap may directly improve the performance of the¯rm by reducing its cash-°ow volatility. Therefore, it is important to control for such ex-post swap bene¯ts while testing for di®erences in ex-ante quality.
Second, if a swap indeed reduces direct and indirect costs of¯nancial distress associated with risky debt, then a¯rm that uses swaps in equilibrium should be able to raise its debt capacity. Thus, our model predicts that the opening and deepening of a swap market in an economy should be accompanied by an increase in the debt ratios of¯rms, especially those with high credit ratings, since they enjoy easy access to the swap market.
Third, since the possibility of speculative swaps is higher for poorly-rated¯rms, our model predicts that highly-rated¯rms should be able to do swaps with many relatively unknown swap dealers, while the poorly-rated¯rms would be restricted to fewer dealers, typically commercial banks, with which they have long-standing credit relationships. Fourth, the model predicts a connection between the use of credit enhancement devices and the reliability of the legal system. Since most credit enhancement devices take the form of clauses included in the swap contract, their e®ectiveness directly depends on the ease with which such clauses can be enforced. Therefore, swap markets in countries with more developed legal systems should rely more on credit enhancement devices, while those in countries with less developed ones should have to rely on long-term relationships with swap counterparties or rationing out lower-rated counterparties altogether.
Casual empiricism seems to be in line with our explanation of the economic role of swaps. Growth in the swap market has occurred concurrently with debt becoming more popular as a¯nancing choice. However, rigorous tests of the empirical implications of this model can be done only with¯rm-level¯nancing and hedging data. We leave that exercise for future research. : Exposure of the¯rm's returns to the risk factor. R: Required (gross) interest-rate on the¯rm's debt. R : Riskfree (gross) interest-rate. 
¤°:
Excess of m over required debt rate. ½: Single-period discount factor. ±: Excess of observed¯rm quality over required debt rate. w: Swap position. X: Swap rate.
Debt and swap rates when debt is senior
For observed¯rm quality » > R + X +°+ e X = 0 (A4a)
f Debt and swap rates when swap is senior For observed¯rm quality » 2 [R + X ¡ e ¡ 2K; R + X + e ¡ 2K]
For observed¯rm quality » 2 [R + X + e ¡ 2K; R + X +°¡ e]
Appendix B
Proposition 1a
Proof: Expected payo® from a completely unhedged position • 2B=K,¯K ¡ 2B < 0 and m = R. When m < R, the bene¯t from hedging is always negative and it is never optimal for equityholders to hedge. 2 Proposition 1b Proof: Expected payo® from a completely unhedged position = E [max(f (m +¯X ¡ R; 0))]
Expected payo® from a hedged position equals 0 if m < R and f (m ¡ R) if m > R. Therefore, bene¯t of complete hedging Proof: Let the T periods be indexed by t. The control variable c(t) 2 fH; N Hg indicates if it is optimal to hedge in period t. p(t) is the probability that the¯rm survives from period
R¡m 2K 2¯K
The Value Function V (t; T ) is the present value of the insider's claim at the end of period t, if the optimal hedging policy is adopted over the remaining periods. ½ = 1=R is the one-period discount factor, i.e., the price of a one-period unit face value discount bond.
[
Therefore, c(t) = H is optimal i® m > R +¯K ¡ 2½V (t + 1; T ). Note that V (t; T ) is a monotone decreasing function of t, since an (s + 1)-period game is equivalent to an speriod one plus one additinal time period with a non-negative cash-°ow payo®. Therefore, V (t + 1; T ) < V (t; T ); 8t. For T = 1, V (1; T ) = V (1; 1) = 0. Then the optimality condition implies that c(0) = H is optimal i® m > R +¯K. But m < R +¯K by de¯nition. Therefore, it is never optimal to hedge when T = 1. For T > 1, V (1; T ) > V (T; T ) = 0, ¤ which implies that c(0) = H is optimal i® m > m (T ) = R +¯K ¡ 2½V (1; T ). Further, using the argument that an s-period game is less valuable than an (s + 1)-period one, we have V (1; T ) > V (1; T ) i® T > T . Together with the optimality condition for c(0), this
implies that m (T ) > m (T + 1). In the limit, in an in¯nitely repeated game, c(0) = H is P 1 t optimal i® c(1) = c(2)::::c(t) = H are also optimal. Then lim
Proposition 3 default when m + X < R, i.e., X < R ¡ m, and are able to pay R when m + X > R, i.e., X > R ¡ m. The debt market therefore sets R(») to satisfy
Solving for R yields the result. In (4c), the argument is as in (4b), except that all¯rms with observed quality » participate. The debt market equilibrium condition is similar to (B3) but with m 2 [R + ± ¡ e; R + ± + e]. In (4d),¯rms with m 2 [R +°; R + ± + e] hedge, making their debt riskfree. Poorer¯rms in the pool, i.e.,¯rms with m 2 [R + ± ¡ e; R +°] default when X < R ¡ m. R(») is set to satisfy
olving yields the result. In (4e), the hedging incentive prevails for all¯rms in the pool with observed credit quality ». The debt market correctly infers this and sets R = R . When a swap market for hedging is not available,¯rms with m > R +°cannot hedge even though they have the incentive to do so. Equations (5a-5e) then follow from reasonings similar to those for equations (4a-4e). 2 Proposition 4 Proof: In (A1a-A1b), some¯rms in the pool have true quality m < R + X ¡ 2K while the others have m > R + X ¡ 2K. Firms in the former group always default, since for them cash-°ow Y = m + X < R + X ¡ X, 8X. Therefore they do not borrow, swap, or invest.
Firms in the latter group have m < R + X +°, since e < K. Therefore, by Lemma 1, they do not have the incentive to hedge and all take speculative swap position w = 1. There is default on both debt and swap, i.e., payo® to debt equals m + X and payo® to swap equals 0 when m + X < R, i.e., X < R ¡ m. There is default on swap but not on debt, i.e., debt R+X¡m payo® is R and swap payo® is m + X ¡ R when m + X ¡ R < X ¡ X, i.e., X < .
2
Thus, the equilibrium conditions in swap and debt markets are
In (A2a-A2b), all¯rms have m > R + X ¡ 2K and m < R + X +°, so they all have the incentive to speculate. Swap and debt market equilibrium conditions are similar to (B5a) and (B5b), with m 2 [» ¡ e; » + e]. In (A3a-A3b), some¯rms have m < R + X +°, while others have m > R + X +°. From Lemma 1, the former (latter) group has the incentive to speculate (hedge). Swap and debt payo®s for speculators are similar to the previous cases, while for hedgers they are X ¡ X and R in all states. Therefore, swap and debt market equilibrium conditions are
Evaluating the integrals and collecting terms, we get equations (A1a)-(A3b). Finally, for m > R + X +°+ e, all¯rms have m > R + X +°, all¯rms hedge, X = 0, and R = R . 2 f Lemma 1 Proof: An equilibrium swap rate X and a swap position w makes the overall e®ective cost of borrowing R + wX. The result follows from Proposition 1. 2 Lemma 2 Proof: Let the¯rm take a speculative position w in swap S = X ¡X. Then expected payo®
Therefore the expected payo® to the 1+w d w K¡X speculator P (w) grows without bound with w, implying that it is optimal to take an unboundedly large position in the swap, given a swap rate and debt rate, (X; R). 2 This table reports equilibrium debt rates R(»; e) for di®erent combinations of observed¯rm quality » and observation error size e. Observed quality » equals true quality m plus a random zero-mean noise ², i.e. » = m+², with ² distributed uniformly over the range [¡e; e]. Realized cash-°ows for thē rm are m+ X, where X is the risk factor realization, distributed uniformly over the range [¡K; K]. Panel A reports results for the case where a market for hedging with swaps is available, and Panel B for the case where such a market is not available. It is optimal for the¯rm to hedge in equilibrium if ¤ its true quality m exceeds m = R(»; e)+°. The debt market sets the debt rate R(»; e) such that the expected return on debt equals the risk-free rate R . Cases in which it is optimal for some¯rms to f hedge are reported in boldface. In these cases, the presence of the swap market reduces default risk and consequently, the equilibrium debt rate R(»; e). * indicates that debt market equilibrium is not feasible. The parameter values used are: R = 1:05; K = 20%;°= 0:1; » 2 [1:0; 1:25]; e 2 [0; 0:2]. This table reports equilibrium debt and swap rates R(»; e) and X(»; e) for di®erent combinations of observed¯rm quality » and observation error size e, when the motive for the swap is unknown. Observed quality » equals true quality m plus a random zero-mean noise ², i.e. » = m + ², with ² distributed uniformly over the range [¡e; e]. All¯rms take swap position w = 1. Realized cash-°ows for the¯rm are m ¡ R ¡ X if the swap is used for hedging, and m + 2X ¡ X ¡ R if it is used for speculating, where X is the risk factor realization, distributed uniformly over the interval [¡K; K]. It ¤ is optimal for a¯rm to hedge in equilibrium if its quality m exceeds m = R(»; e)+X(»; e)+°, and to speculate otherwise. The debt market sets R(»; e) such that the expected return on debt equals R .
f Similarly, the swap market sets the swap rate X(»; e) such that the expected payo® to the swap equals zero. Panels A and B report debt and swap rates, respectively, for the case when the debt is senior to the swap. Panel C reports debt rates for the case when the swap is senior to the debt. In the latter case, the swap is riskfree, so X = 0. * indicates that debt and swap market equilibria are not feasible.
The parameter values used are: R = 1:05; K = 20%;°= 0:1; w = 1; » 2 [1:00; 1:25]; e 2 [0; 0:2]:
f Figure 1 Regions of optimality for hedging and not hedging in the absence and presence of speculative swaps.
This¯gure illustrates the incentive to hedge in the absence and presence of speculative swaps. The two upward-sloping straight lines mark the boundaries of true¯rm quality m possible, (» ¡ e; » + e),
¤
given an observed¯rm quality ». The curve hh indicates m = R(»; e)+°, the minimum level of truē rm quality m for hedging to be optimal, when speculative swaps are absent. The curve ss indicates ¤ m = R(»; e) + X(»; e) +°when speculative swaps are present. Region A represents¯rms for which it is optimal not to hedge both in the presence and absence of speculative swaps. Similarly, region C represents¯rms for which it is optimal to hedge under both scenarios. However, for¯rms in region B, it is optimal to hedge when speculative swaps are excluded, and to speculate when such swaps are allowed. Parameter values used are: R = 1:05; K = 20%;°= 0:1; w = 1; e = 0:1; » 2 [1:00; 1:25]:
f Figure 2 Possible combinations of¯rm quality, operating exposure, and swap position.
This¯gure shows the possible combinations of¯rm quality m and operating exposure¯for¯rms, given a swap position w. There are two groups in the pool of¯rms with w = +1 (the shaded cells):
one group has quality m < m ,¯= +1, and swaps to speculate; the other group has m > m , = ¡1, and swaps to hedge. Similarly, there are two groups in the pool of¯rms with w = ¡1 (the ¤ unshaded cells): one group has quality m < m ,¯= ¡1, and swaps to speculate; the other group ¤ has m > m ,¯= +1, and swaps to hedge.
Figure 3
Regions of optimality for hedging and not hedging when speculative swaps are possible.
The¯gure shows combinations of¯rm quality m and swap position w for which it is optimal to hedge/not hedge. Realized cash-°ows for the¯rm are m + X where X is the risk factor, distributed uniformly over [¡K; K] . The market observes the imprecise version » of true quality m, i.e., » = m + ², where the observation error ² is distributed uniformly over [¡e; e] . Based on observed » and w, the swap market sets the swap rate X. A represents¯rms with quality m greater than the cut-o® ¤ level m = R + wX +°and it is optimal for these¯rms to hedge. Firms in region B have quality ¤ m less than m and it is optimal for such¯rms not to hedge. For large enough w, all¯rms in the pool lie in B.
